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Abstract 
UK energy policies position urban heat networks as components of a resilient low 
carbon, affordable system, but, as Stewart Russell’s work showed, such technologies 
have never been integrated into UK provision. This paper takes Russell’s legacy 
forward by examining prospects for urban district heating and combined heat and 
power development, in the context of the financial, rather than technological, 
innovations shaped by liberalised energy and financial markets. Drawing on sociology 
of markets and social studies of finance, the paper examines the resulting evaluation 
practices. Findings indicate that such district energy infrastructure does not conform 
to the investment calculus, making a business case hard to establish. Bridging the 
value gap between liberalised finance and district energy requires actors willing to 
devise improvised solutions. In spite of the established sustainability credentials of 
the technology therefore, significant deployment in the UK (and similar countries) 
will depend on political leadership and new fiscal policy.  
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Evaluating Urban Energy Systems in the UK - the 
Implications for Financing Heat Networks  
Introduction 
 
‘…our goal is to make sure that investable projects across our priority sectors can 
obtain finance in the market place.’ (UK Government Officer, Low Carbon 
Investment Team) 
 
Contemporary energy policies and scenarios project a future of low energy 
consumption in a secure, affordable low carbon system (UK Government Department 
of Energy and Climate Change (UK DECC), 2011a; 2011b; European Commission 
(EC), 2011). Behind the aspirations however lie contested, and uncertain, models for 
how any transformation may be brought about, by whom, using what resources and 
with what implications for shares of costs and benefits. Such uncertainty and 
contestation are for example embedded in the terms of UK Green Investments, which 
received £3bn capitalisation from the UK Treasury in 2012 to address the lack of 
investment in low carbon technologies, on condition that it operates on the same 
market terms identified as responsible for the current failure to invest.  
This paper focuses on prospects for investment in meso-scale district energy1 and heat 
network infrastructures, which are defined in UK Government strategy as a key aspect 
of sustainable energy (UK DECC, 2013), and are targeted in UK Green Investment 
Bank (GIB) energy efficiency strategy (UK GIB, 2014). Investment in district energy 
in the UK remains, however, very limited (UK DECC, 2013: 39). The paper uses a 
sociological perspective on markets and social studies of finance (Beckert, 2009; 
Callon, 1998; Carruthers and Kim, 2011; MacKenzie, 2009) to explore the reasons for 
apparent mismatch between the sustainability value attributed to such technologies in 
policy and their low valuation as an investment proposition in practice. It uses 
ethnographic research to assess the strategies of public and private sector 
organisations engaged in ‘making the finances stack up’ to secure ‘the investable 
project’. Rather than treating market valuations of energy technologies as economic 
objects subject to universal laws of supply and demand which exist outside societal 
processes, the sociological perspective used here examines the socially-embedded 
production of value. The perspective is derived from classical sociological theory 
exemplified in Max Weber’s (2000 [1894]) analysis of the centrality of politics and 
power relationships in financial markets, and Karl Polanyi’s (1957 [1944]) appraisal 
of the embedding of economic exchange in social networks where political beliefs 
and ideologies inform value attribution. Recent scholarship has extended these 
foundations through examination of the processes of producing and reinforcing, or 
sometimes undermining, market facts, which are critical to market operation and 
attributions of value (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 2009). Such facts and metrics, such 
                                                 
1 Defined here as ranging from a Combined Heat and Power (CHP) engine, or heat-only boiler, to 
supply a small number of inter-connected buildings, such as housing estates &/or public and 
commercial buildings, up to inner city scale with an area-wide network connecting multiple heat 
producers and mixed public, commercial and residential users.   
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as rates of return on invested capital, are interpreted as a socio-technical 
accomplishment which brings particular kinds of economy, economic actors, and 
material outcomes into being (Caliskan & Callon, 2009). The sociology of markets 
and social studies of finance have however been relatively neglected in analyses of 
transitions to sustainable energy, where most attention has focused on the study of 
innovations in technology ‘hardware’. This paper suggests that recent innovations in 
finance, using economic theory and mathematical knowledge, are reshaping market 
facts and the production of value (MacKenzie, 2009), with significant consequences 
for energy infrastructure and the characteristics of transition to a low carbon energy 
system.  
The UK is a significant case study for questions relating to the evaluation and 
financing of low carbon energy infrastructure. On the one hand UK and Scottish 
Government climate change legislation has set ambitious targets and timetables for 
energy decarbonisation and demand reduction. On the other hand, in the liberalised 
energy system, solutions are expected to derive less from co-ordinated planning than 
from financial markets, where the discovery of viable commercial returns on private 
investment governs the prioritising and configuring of any low carbon provision. UK 
energy policy has recognised the failures of current market structures to deliver 
investment in secure and affordable low carbon energy, but envisages adjustments to 
the existing regulatory frame, rather than systemic reform (UK DECC, 2011a). Rather 
than holistic appraisal of optimal routes to energy systems decarbonisation, policy 
development has focused on electricity. Heat has remained marginal until very 
recently, even though more energy is used for heating than for the generation of 
electricity. For example in the UK, almost half (46 per cent) of the final energy used 
is for heat; a further 41 per cent is used for transport, while only 8 per cent is used to 
provide electricity (UK DECC, 2012: 10). Around three quarters of the heat is used in 
domestic, commercial and public buildings; the remainder is used in industrial 
processes. In 2012, the UK government published a heat strategy, which concluded 
that climate change mitigation targets necessitate radical change to reduce energy 
used for heating, and to use low carbon or renewable sources to meet remaining 
requirements. Policy frameworks (UK DECC, 2013; Scottish Government, 2013) 
envisage a combination of solutions, including building insulation, electrification of 
heat and changes to the content of the gas grid. They also attribute value to low 
carbon heat networks in circumstances where development is justified by density and 
diversity of heat demand, and by the likely availability of local heat sources which 
would otherwise be wasted. These documents begin to incorporate a systemic model 
of energy, identifying the potential of heat networks to reduce the total costs, and 
improve the resilience, of a low carbon energy system, over and above their local 
value: ‘the capacity of networks to store heat helps to tackle system balancing issues, 
and diverse heat sources will also reduce pressure on peak grid demand’ (UK DECC, 
2013: 45). By virtue of their territorial powers, knowledge and resources, local 
authorities are expected to be critical intermediaries in such developments. 
 
The UK Historical Trajectory of Heat Networks and their Contested Value  
Energy generated close to its point of use, at the meso scale, is recognised as having 
social, economic and environmental value in relation to carbon saving and affordable 
heat, and having potential to re-localise inter-relations of use, ownership and control 
(Kelly and Pollitt, 2010; UK Committee on Climate Change, 2010). Such district 
energy technologies, delivering heat, hot water and sometimes cooling, via an area-
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based network of underground pipes, or thermal grids, are well-established in Europe, 
but provide only around 2% of UK space and water heating. Stewart Russell’s (1986; 
1993; 1996; 2010) work examined the failure to integrate district energy (combined 
heat and power (CHP) and district heating (DH) or heat networks) into UK energy 
provisions, despite periodic policy advocacy and on-going improvements in 
technology. His work, examining CHP/DH up to the period following energy 
privatisation, concluded that such developments that have occurred have always 
required some form of state intervention to counteract the short-term economics of the 
energy sector. This was the case under both state and private ownership of energy 
generation and supply, indicating that limited development is not the result of system 
ownership per se. Russell argued instead that it is the result of the wider UK economy 
and polity, which have produced an energy sector geared to commercial economies of 
scale, and avoidance of social obligations. An increasingly specialised and segmented 
energy supply chain has limited capability to capture the integrated energy 
productivity of district energy which requires coordinated, predictable long-term 
planning. Post-privatisation, the more complex regulatory structure of the industry 
made the prospects for CHP/DH more unpredictable:  
‘To the extent that CHP did show an upturn in the early 1990s … particularly in 
large industrial installations and in packaged mini-cogeneration units, it could 
not be argued convincingly that this came about because of the form of the 
restructured sector, but still rather in most respects in spite of it; in many ways 
the fundamental problems were reinforced and exacerbated, it still had to fit as 
best it could into a system that has not been designed to suit it, and there were 
no evident incentives or commitment towards energy efficiency built into the 
new arrangements.’ (Russell, 2010: 6). 
 
The historical absence of a focus on heat (as opposed to gas and electricity) provision 
resulted in the lack of a directly responsible UK policy-making and regulatory 
authority. Investment decisions were framed by short-term cost logics, even when the 
initial objectives of periodic investigation were long-term social and environmental 
benefits. Russell concluded that the economics of meso-scale CHP and DH have been 
constituted as marginal not because of their inherent lack of societal value, but 
because their evaluation was always embedded in the political-economic institutions, 
and physical infrastructures, of an energy sector increasingly modelled on the scale 
economies of centralised, large scale, generation of electricity, and gas grids.  
 
The potential of district energy and heat networks to contribute to energy productivity 
and to reduce the total costs of a resilient low carbon energy system has again been 
raised in the context of climate change risks. The feasibility of an all-electric solution 
to decarbonisation of heat, with very large seasonal variation in demand and 
consequent need for (probably high carbon) expensive stand-by plant and grid 
reinforcement, is subject to scrutiny (Spiers et al., 2010). The low source fuel 
conversion efficiencies of large scale thermal power generation without heat capture, 
and with energy lost through long distance transmission, have also returned to the 
agenda. The costs and benefits of district energy, as a component of a low carbon 
system, are however contested, given the sunk investment in centralised electricity 
and gas grids. Risk assessment centres on the capital cost of heat grid infrastructure, 
and the lag between initial investment and revenues, combined with the lack of an 
existing regulatory framework for heat and the associated difficulty of securing a 
long-term revenue stream in the absence of an existing customer base. The UK also 
 5 
lacks supply chains, skills and business models. All of these factors tend to increase 
attributed risk, and hence the cost, of development, relative to European countries 
with established heat networks (Pöyry, 2009), militating against straightforward 
demonstration of financial value of investment.  
A number of local authorities have however proceeded to develop district energy 
projects, using criteria of value derived from energy and carbon saving, provision of 
affordable heating and regeneration of urban centres; raising the necessary finance is 
however a key area of difficulty (BRE et al., 2013). The conventional principles used 
in configuring project finance are exemplified in Appendix 1. This is extracted from 
an Ernst and Young presentation to a district energy finance workshop2, and shows a 
financial model devised from various combinations of debt and equity. Debt is 
considered to be cheaper than equity, so debt finance is expected to form the largest 
proportion. Public sector debt can usually be raised at lower cost than private finance; 
some local authorities may therefore borrow to finance investment, managing the 
risks through a variety of governance and contractual structures, including arms 
length organisations and joint ventures. Other authorities may be reluctant, or unable, 
to accept the risk of borrowing in order to finance energy infrastructure, when they 
have no statutory duty to do so, and they may regard themselves as lacking the 
required knowledge and capacity. A claimed lack of capacity may stem from the 
underlying financial position of certain local authorities, where existing Private 
Finance or Public Private Partnership projects result in a high proportion of revenues 
being committed to servicing existing debt. In the absence of any change in financial 
regulations, such authorities may have little option but to pursue a commercial model, 
transferring risk to private contractors to develop, own and operate the system, under 
a long-term concession contract for heat and power supply. The costs of such an 
energy services contract are set against revenue rather than capital budgets; over the 
long term the total financial cost is likely to be higher, but there is no immediate 
addition to total borrowing. Urban heat network development is hence challenging, 
not only because of the physical disruption entailed in embedding new infrastructure 
in a densely populated place, but also because of the demands of assembling a locally 
feasible and legitimate financial calculus which is acceptable to local authority 
political leaders and executive officers, as well as other parties. 
The Sociological Perspective on Evaluation Practices in Financial Markets  
What is little publicly debated, however, and indeed is frequently ‘naturalised’, is 
why, when evidence of the wider environmental, social and energy saving value of 
district energy technologies is accepted, their measured financial value remains low, 
and the risk calculus is generally unfavourable to investment. Social science research 
on innovations in financial engineering suggests that these instruments have 
significantly reshaped financial markets, with material impacts on value creation 
(Knorr-Cetina and Preda, 2012; MacKenzie, 2009). Contemporary political-economic 
commitment to the attributed efficiency of liberalised markets shapes the field of 
possibilities, situating finance as a significant dimension of socio-technical 
innovation. Questions about the non-financialised public value to be derived from 
different forms of, and routes to, sustainable energy for urban settings, become 
marginalised.  
                                                 
2 The Workshop is one of a series of knowledge exchange events organised as a collaborative venture 
between the research team and a district energy practitioner. Details from www.heatandthecity.org.uk   
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The powerful neo-liberal discourse of the last 30 years has claimed that financial 
innovation, particularly complex instruments for securitisation of assets and 
accelerated capital recycling, is a major contributor to risk management for socio-
technical innovation and market expansion in advanced capitalist economies (Engelen 
et al., 2010). The resulting financialisation of advanced economies (Erturk, et al., 
2008) is visible in corporate restructuring to prioritise financial value as the core 
performance indicator, and in the widespread legitimising of discourses of 
shareholder value (Crouch, 2011; Preda, 2009). Value is framed within a techno-
economic policy model, which asserts that markets are rational-instrumental means of 
resource allocation, generating economic value by allocating capital efficiently 
according to its calculated productivity. The role of government in this model is 
restricted to removal of ‘market barriers’ by for example using restricted public 
finance to mobilise significant private capital investment. An efficient market is 
expected to allocate resources to technological development, because its value will be 
captured in financial returns to investors. The problems of creating an investable 
project are conceived as amenable to financial engineering, which is constituted as a 
means of de-risking investment. Financial metrics are increasingly applied to 
decisions governing investment in essential infrastructures, resulting in the treatment 
of infrastructure as a standardised component of an asset portfolio, tradeable in a 
global market to maximise returns to private shareholders (Torrance, 2008). The 
underlying epistemology informing such evaluation methodologies, and what is 
included or excluded as a relevant factor in investment decisions, remains outside the 
frame and largely unexamined. There are however critical questions about whether 
such instruments are fit for purpose in relation to the long-term public interest in, and 
wider social value of, a sustainable, affordable and resilient energy system. 
Sociology problematises this naturalising of financial evaluation, and argues that 
financial market instruments can instead be studied as a problem in the sociology of 
knowledge, an area of research which investigates empirically the social production 
of scientific, or expert, knowledge in the context of its institutional structures and 
cultural and political processes (Bloor, 2004; Shapin, 1995). Knowledge is understood 
as a form of shared belief, which may or may not be justified in practice, but which 
has attained the status of factual knowledge through the technologically mediated 
work of expert practitioner communities. Recent research has brought concepts from 
the sociology of scientific knowledge to the analysis of knowledge claims and 
processes in financial markets, where the facticity of market numbers is typically a 
prerequisite for a functioning market (Carruthers and Stinchcombe, 1999; MacKenzie, 
2006; 2009). In the related tradition of actor network theory, the economy is treated 
not as an independent object, but as a societal phenomenon itself constituted by 
theories of economics and finance, which become enmeshed in practices of market 
formation (Callon, 1998; Callon, 2007). Associated questions about authority, power 
relations, and knowledge are the subject of renewed sociological focus through the 
analysis of evaluation techniques as a means of understanding the social production 
of material value (Beckert, 2009), and of different ‘orders of worth’ (Boltanski and 
Thevenot, 2007), which are central to the coordinated production of markets, 
including energy markets. The boundaries, differential qualities, and the relative value 
of resources to be transacted all have to be negotiated in order to constitute a market. 
Such structured power relations are amenable to analysis through study of the 
distributed knowledge of complex corporate and government actors, and the rules and 
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instruments of markets. Knowledge formations, and their embodiment in ‘soft’ as 
well as ‘hard’ technologies, are conceptualised as the, at least partial, fixing of 
outcomes of struggles for power. Economic models in these terms are not derived 
from empirical observation of a fixed economic reality, but contribute to bringing the 
attributed phenomena of a particular market rationality into being, through the 
provision of behavioural scripts and algorithms (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 2006). 
Social studies of finance and the sociology of markets seek to avoid a functionalist 
analysis of market mechanisms of risk and value calculation in order to reveal the 
underlying contests and conflicts of interest, and the ultimately precarious qualities of 
market facts (MacKenzie, 2009). In the context of energy markets, the sociology of 
knowledge offers insights into the processes of evaluation which inform business 
investment. The following discussion examines such processes and their implications 
for assessments of value in district energy projects.  
 
Methodology and Data 
Drawn from a larger research project, qualitative data are used to explore the 
perspectives applied by finance practitioners and energy utilities to the evaluation of 
meso-scale energy project developments. These data focus on the context-bound, 
interaction-oriented aspects of financial practices. The aim is to gain insight into the 
actor’s perspective, while seeking to avoid assumptions about the pre-given, normal 
or taken for granted qualities of the processes explored.  
Analysis is based on the following data:  
• Semi-structured interviews with nine finance experts (two representatives of a UK 
government low carbon investment team; three environmental finance specialists  
- two employed by a transnational finance and accounting corporation and one 
partner in an independent consultancy; two finance consultants with long-term 
expertise in UK privatisation of public infrastructure, development of Private 
Finance Initiative and Public Private Partnership instruments, private equity fund 
management and infrastructure procurement; two representatives of corporate 
banking with responsibility for lending to renewable energy and energy efficiency 
sectors); and five community energy market managers from two of the six large 
scale gas and electricity utilities which supply the UK3.  
• Presentations and discussions from a one-day workshop on financing district 
energy, organised by the research team in collaboration with a district energy 
practitioner. The Workshop was attended by 25 local authority representatives and 
a mix of finance experts, consulting engineers and district energy suppliers.  
• Interaction with the UK government Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(UK DECC) through analysis of heat policy documents and attendance at a 
workshop on market barriers to district heating. 
• A data set of forty-four case studies of district heating projects developed in the 
last ten years (BRE et al., 20134). Interviews included a key section on finance. 
The research findings were a component of evidence used in formulation of heat 
policy (UK DECC, 2013). 
• Interaction with the Scottish government energy team to investigate policy 
instruments to accelerate delivery of low carbon and renewable heat5. 
                                                 
3 See Appendix 2 for description of interviewees directly quoted 
4 The author was a member of the research consortium led by BRE and reporting to UK DECC 
5 The author is a member of the Scottish Government Expert Commission on District Heating 
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• Interaction with the trade association, UK CHPA, to gain insight into their 
strategic position on urban heat network policy instruments and financing. 
• Interaction with senior managers and non-executive chair of a large-scale energy 
utility at an invited meeting of a stakeholder forum to consider city scale low 
carbon investment strategy.  
 
 
Evaluating Urban Energy Investment 
 
1. The Dominant Frame: ‘Constrained Public Finances’ and Risk in a 
Centralised, Regulated Energy Market  
 
‘…and we all recognise that there’s a finite pool of public funding out there. So if 
we are limited to that sort of funding to invest in the green space, that is going to 
severely constrain the base investment’ (UK government officer, Low Carbon 
Investments team). 
 
Two interlocking narratives stemming from neo-liberal political-economy provide the 
dominant frame for evaluating the viability of urban energy developments. The first is 
illustrated in the above quote, which situates constrained public sector finance for low 
carbon investment as unavoidable, rather than as a matter of political decision. The 
second narrative, which is the necessary counterpart to the first, denotes the 
continuing commitment, post-financial crash, to financial market innovation to 
stimulate new private investment in energy infrastructure particularly in the 
unfamiliar urban scale energy efficiency technologies: 
‘the sort of ultimate, if you could create a model where public sector sort of 
stands behind investment, and then the business model is proven, that can then 
be refinanced by private capital, and then that capital can be recycled’ (UK 
government officer, Low Carbon Investments team). 
 
Investment in energy infrastructure has been progressively redirected away from the 
financial logics of national systems of energy production, and innovation, to those of 
internationalising capital markets, technology and fuel supply chains (Winskel, 2002). 
In a market context structured by large corporations, where the main performance 
indicator is shareholder value, long-term investment programmes have been displaced 
by an emphasis on ‘asset sweating’ and short-term investment horizons. The major 
utilities built strong balance sheets, with ‘deep pools of capital for utility type risk’ 
(UK government officer, Low Carbon Investments team). The UK energy market 
regulatory framework has also guaranteed predictable returns on large-scale 
investment in generation and transmission, and in electricity and gas distribution 
networks. Available capital has been deployed by the utilities in line with the 
established procurement models for centralised energy infrastructure, enabling them 
to ‘satisfy their investors on the basis that they can provide predictable returns… 
through a regulatory environment…’ (UK government officer, Low Carbon 
Investment team). For energy infrastructure, high value is therefore placed on large-
scale de-contextualised, standardised technologies suited to the economics of 
liberalised markets. In this framework, the utilities ‘know exactly what they’re 
building; they know exactly how to do it… The actual projects themselves are large 
scale, economically viable, generation schemes’ (Asset Management Consultant), and 
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they are able to use their ‘strong lobbying ability with government’ (Asset 
Management Consultant) to protect incumbent interests: 
‘Frankly we have a cartel within the electricity supply, and the government is 
unwilling to break it until it’s solved the generation problem, because the big 
six suppliers, oops they’re the big six generators… By and large the 
generators and suppliers are the same people… But the real problem is that 
the market has not in fact been opened’ (Financial Investment Consultant).  
 
External investors similarly rely on the application of standardised risk assessment 
instruments to identify easily replicable investment opportunities, producing reliable 
returns:  
A: If you’re a bank … you want the lowest risk, the best return that can be 
churned out like a sausage machine.  
B: And it’s systematised; they’ve done it before and they’ll carry on doing it 
again… Cookie cutter. 
A: It was. That’s a good phrase: cookie cutter. This [district energy] is exactly 
the opposite of that.’  
(Environmental Finance Specialists A and B).  
 
In standardising evaluation around the criteria of maximising predictable financial 
returns, such templates de-contextualise and delocalise investment decisions, 
obscuring any local benefits. For example the energy utility stakeholder forum 
observed by the author addressed the topic of future energy investments at city scale. 
The post-privatisation withdrawal of the business from customised locality-based 
energy planning, despite its public benefit, was acknowledged: ‘[Utility] has for a 
long time ignored its cities and turned to the international agenda. We used to have 
DH in [X City] because it was proved that it reduced the maintenance costs of 
buildings’ (Utility Senior Manager, energy networks). The main business of the 
meeting examined the socio-economic rationale for re-engagement and collaboration 
between the utility and urban authorities. Joint benefits derived from synergies 
between political, economic and social goals of localities, and utility business goals 
were identified. Business benefits were cited as: reduced costs of electricity network 
investment associated with distributed generation, delivering mandated carbon 
savings and new revenues from innovation in energy services. The projected UK 
market for such developments was estimated as in excess of £100 billion, with near-
term opportunities of around £2 billion, as well as potential to meet energy company 
obligations for carbon reduction and affordable warmth. Two thirds of the value of 
decentralised energy opportunities was expected to derive from CHP/DH.  
 
Liberalised financial markets, however, have resulted in corporate structures geared to 
a central performance metric of share price, and the maximising of shareholder value, 
in relation to a global asset portfolio. Finance experts have progressively displaced 
engineers as chief executives (Fligstein and Dauter, 2007; Krippner, 2005; Zorn et al., 
2005), as in this case where the corporate director of the utility’s UK operations 
joined the company from a career in investment finance. He in turn must recommend 
any proposed UK investment to a transnational parent company board, and in this 
instance concluded that there was no business case which could succeed at board 
level, given the availability of secure, regulated returns through other routes. An 
idealised market model asserts that limited resources are rationally allocated 
according to laws of capital productivity. In advanced capitalist economies however 
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the rules of resource allocation, and even the scale of resources available, are 
contingent on politically-informed negotiation between state and market actors, with 
results embodied in regulatory frames governing property rights and rules of trade 
(Fligstein and Dauter, 2007). In relation to electricity and gas transmission and 
distribution, for example, the UK’s regulated asset base model guarantees a secure, 
predictable return on capital investment in networks through a periodically reviewed 
price control formula (Ofgem, 2013). This logic of value marginalises localised 
spatial and energy planning for integrated heat and power, however, despite policy 
recognition of likely benefits to system efficiencies and reduced network 
reinforcement costs.  
 
The economics of locally customised meso-scale CHP and urban heat networks are 
hence constituted as marginal in the context of a state regulatory framework which 
rewards investment in a centralised system, where incumbent corporations are 
oriented to short-term financial performance in global markets. The initial capital 
investment and the long-term uncertainties of payback associated with particularities 
of place result in perceived risk to capital, increasing the cost of loans, and limiting 
the financial viability of projects: 
 
 ‘…go and talk to Drax and they’ll say “we’re very happy to talk about… 
replacing a big power station, but what on earth would we want to go and 
invest what would be ten times the amount of staff to do probably a hundred 
times as many, little, individual CHP schemes dotted around. Where on earth 
is the economics behind that?”… And you compare everything there is 
opposite to CHP: small scale, relatively ad-hoc procurement, disparate 
interested parties. They’ve got to get through all the planning bureaucracies 
of doing development in the middle of big cities; regulatory risk; policy 
uncertainty; lack of clarity over revenue risks and who is taking which risks; 
promoted by small industry players, who, you know, you can’t blame them for 
trying, but they just don’t have the same lobbying ear that the big six have. 
And that’s really the conundrum isn’t it?’ (Asset Management Consultant) 
 
Standardised risk assessment tools put a correspondingly high cost on alternatives to 
business as usual: ‘The issue is risk, perceived risk’ (Finance Investment Consultant). 
In relation to urban heat networks:  
‘Unfortunately with heat, the key risk and the key downside is… you haven’t 
got a heat grid, so you come back to, again and again, [to] the bankability of 
that heat and the credit worthiness of the heat off-takers’ (Environmental 
Finance Specialist B). 
 
‘The big challenge is how do you de-risk them [heat networks] in such a way 
that you can attract the pools of low cost finance’ (UK Government Officer, 
Low Carbon Investment Team). 
 
During periods of policy uncertainty, such as those relating to electricity market 
reform, however, all energy investments were regarded by market actors contributing 
to this research as risky. The state, rather than business, was considered responsible 
for ‘the investment fundamentals’ of stable, secure and predictable cash flows: the 
‘private sector won’t invest speculatively… Large industrial players … will invest 
once policy certainty and detail are established… CHP requires industrial and 
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political sponsors’ (Asset Management Consultant). The constitution of market 
reform, including guaranteed strike prices for electricity, is for example under 
development between government and utilities in relation to a proposed new 
generation of nuclear power stations:   
‘They’re saying that they’ll only be funded if the power companies are 
prepared to actually take the risks of producing and generating the electricity 
off them. But that is disingenuous, because the disposal of the nuclear waste, 
they’re saying ‘don’t worry about that, we’ll sort that out.’ Well hang on a 
minute, you know, the infrastructure involved in disposing of nuclear waste is 
going to be enormous, not just in terms of engineering, but in terms of 
cost…But… there are very strong backers within government for nuclear 
power’ (Asset Management Consultant). 
 
Conversely district energy was perceived as lacking the government sponsorship and 
covenants embodied in the financial innovations introduced through the Private 
Finance Initiative and Public Private Partnerships. The main ‘risk’ in investment in 
local energy systems stems therefore not so much from its price per se, or lack of 
capital for investment, as from the constitution of its economic value relative to 
established markets and the interests of incumbents, where ‘developers are 
developers, councils are councils, utility companies are utility companies, and district 
heating doesn’t fit any of them’ (Finance Investment Consultant). The lack of fit for 
meso-scale CHP and DH with the established high value placed on centralised energy 
markets, and large-scale, decontextualised technology investment structured around 
guaranteed rates of return on capital, means that their substantive benefits remain 
elusive in the financial calculus.  
 
2. Making the Market Work for Low Carbon Investment  
  
‘The holy grail is this model which enables both to be done in an intelligent manner, 
combining both public and private finance’ (UK Government Officer, Low Carbon 
Investment Team) 
 
A powerful theme in the evolving narrative of a liberalised energy market is that the 
role of government is to address attributed ‘market failure’ in areas where private 
investment is lacking, despite other dimensions of value such as carbon saving or 
local economic regeneration. A key instrument of government policy is the quasi-
autonomous UK Green Investment Bank, which is required to apply market rules for 
allocation of public finance to projects. In relation to financial innovation oriented to 
formatting an energy efficiency market, its remit is confined to debt financing in what 
is construed as the ‘narrow space’ between projects which already attract private 
capital, and those which are substantively uneconomic. It is charged with ‘crowding 
capital in’ by deploying public funds into the private sector in order to ‘help the 
market to generate deal flows’ (UK Government Officer, Low Carbon Investment 
Team) in targeted areas. It is not allowed to provide start-up equity, low cost loans or 
financial guarantees. The model thus relies on use of bounded public finance to invest 
on commercial terms, and to incentivise the rapid recycling of capital through for 
example the creation of a new energy efficiency asset class which can be securitised: 
‘We have to focus on commercially viable investments and we’re about 
leveraging private capital into the market… Additionality and leverage is 
really important to our mission... If we can demonstrate to the market that you 
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can make good money in these sectors, then private capital will follow in large 
volumes’ (UK Government Officer, Low Carbon Investment Team).  
 
Addressing the need to constitute a market where investors perceive little or no value 
entails building legitimacy to create and sustain shared belief that financial returns 
can be reliably achieved in such disregarded sectors. Legitimacy is consciously 
courted through the selection of officers who ‘understand how the City works’ 
(Finance Investment Consultant). Fund manager partners must not only have a track 
record for efficiency and reliability in allocating and managing funds and project 
portfolios, but also pass ‘the reputation smell-test’ or ‘the Sunday Mail test’ (UK 
Government Officer, Low Carbon Investment Team), indicating that cultural 
dimensions of evaluation practices are expected to be a significant factor in making 
low carbon energy and energy efficiency markets work. The UK GIB is positioned as 
a market intermediary channelling information about the trustworthiness of trading 
partners through social networks; the resulting reputational capital, anchored in shared 
beliefs about reliability and trustworthiness, is expected to resolve uncertainties over 
the value of the products traded (Granovetter, 1985; Podolny, 2001; White, 2002).  
 
The stance taken by the UK Government in specifying that UK green investment 
lending must be solely on commercial terms is contested by other market actors, who 
suggest that ‘rethinking the problem, and doing it a different way’ (Finance 
Investment Consultant) might be more productive in achieving the overall objectives 
of a low carbon energy system. One informant noted that the model was likely to have 
the perverse result of increasing the overall cost of local energy infrastructure finance:  
‘And one of the problems… rather than moving commercial debt to prudential 
rates, which is the French model, UK GI is saying “well we’re going to move 
prudential rates on to commercial levels, because we’re not prepared to lend 
unless the banks do… because it’s not on market terms”’ (Asset Management 
Consultant). 
 
Such rules are in practice however expected to evolve in operation, and in negotiation 
over European sanctions against state aid: 
‘It would be interesting to see when they’ve got a throughput of projects how 
many of them have been on true market terms… I mean they’re under immense 
pressure to push capital into the market place… I don’t think they’ve had a 
great deal of success on that front to date’ (Investment Manager, corporate 
banking).  
 
The market finance model is thus more precariously established, less singular and 
more susceptible to contestation than its formalistic definition as a mechanism of 
efficient resource allocation implies. Making the market work for low carbon 
investment may consequently have more scope for improvisation than acknowledged 
in public statements of policy. 
 
3. The Risk to Public Value?  
That there is public value in district energy investments, both in terms of cost and 
carbon savings, seems little disputed: 
‘What I would say for district heating is almost the nice thing about it is it 
stacks up from a pure economics perspective…so particularly within a 
landscape where you have such a poor state of energy structure within the 
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local authority and public sector user, the introduction of a retrofit gas fired 
CHP, plus pipework, plus boilers, plus the associated energy efficiency 
measures to provide guaranteed savings, would reduce carbon emissions by 
20 per cent. It would save the local authority or NHS or a public sector user X 
hundred thousand pounds per annum.’ (Investment Manager, corporate 
banking) 
As this manager went on to comment, such investments in ‘non-core’ energy services 
would also return finance to core public services by reducing energy costs over the 
life cycle, thus creating further public benefit.  
 
Contemporary evaluation frameworks have however limited the pace and scale of 
urban CHP and DH projects: ‘It’s very much sort of only the gold plated, de-risked 
projects that are actually going forward with private sector funding in them’ 
(Environmental Finance Specialist B). Development has taken place mainly where 
profitability for private investors is secured by some form of public guarantee or risk 
underwriting; this may include more than long term contracts with secure revenues, 
and extend to factors such as the anticipated reputational or ‘brand’ value of 
investment in prestige developments. In relation to Olympic Park district energy 
investment for example, ‘I think they’re banking on the fact that it’s probably the 
highest profile development site in the country, and if it turns into a white elephant 
it’ll be a national embarrassment’ (Environmental Finance Specialist B). Such 
projects may however function primarily as a showcase for capital (Hodson and 
Marvin, 2010), without ensuring commensurate public benefits. Long term private 
finance contracts governing prestige projects are positive in demonstrating the 
potential structures for private public partnerships, and access to private finance, but 
such long term concession contracts for energy supply should theoretically show the 
added public benefits resulting from increased total project cost of private finance. In 
practice, private sector operators exercise significant control over their future 
direction, making long-term public value creation uncertain: ‘effectively the public 
sector needs to package something up, hand it over and keep their fingers crossed 
that they will be able to somehow influence the private sector going forward’ 
(Environmental Finance Specialist B).  
 
Most urban areas also lack ‘that sort of brand’ (Environmental Finance Specialist A) 
associated with public investment in high profile developments such as the Olympic 
Park ‘where we know it’s going to happen’ (Environmental Finance Specialist A). 
Hence to attract investment at sufficiently low cost of capital for a project to proceed, 
‘somebody within that circle has got to absorb a higher degree of risk. Now in the 
deals that we’ve done to date that has … been predominantly the public sector end 
user that, because of lack of capital, has commercially taken the view that they’ll 
accept that risk provision’ (Investment Manager, Corporate Banking). The ultimate 
risk, and its cost, remains with the public sector. This may mean that other towns and 
cities will be experimental sites for market testing a privately-financed ‘green 
development’ model, where standard risk instruments do not adequately incorporate 
the future substantive risks to the locality of their contribution to guaranteeing private 
returns. Private finance is legally accountable to shareholders; local accountability 
and wider public value may prove difficult to secure. 
 
4. Bricolage and Alternative Hierarchies of Value  
 14 
When technical devices such as those of liberalised finance are legitimised by 
government regulation, and established as authoritative in evaluating energy 
investments, then interpretative flexibility has been restricted, and the value of some 
technological trajectories has been given relatively fixed, durable meaning (Clegg, 
1989). But such configurations of power are not monolithic. During periods of major 
political economic uncertainty, as at present, any model of a singular stable and self-
regulating market under-recognises the tensions within and among institutions, or the 
potential for a plurality of ‘partial’ market and non-market investment schema to be in 
operation, with different goals and assumptions. Such tensions may work as catalysts 
to innovation and change, as suggested by sociological analyses of the productivity of 
intra- and inter-organisational dissonance, and discrepancy in assumptions and 
understandings between different groups (Boltanski and Thevenot, 2007; Stark, 
2009). Research interviews and ethnographic data provide evidence of such 
dissonances and of the recognised need for new variants of situated financial 
innovation. This is innovation of an improvisatory kind, characteristic of the bricolage 
responses of financial actors to changing circumstances (Beunza and Stark, 2003), but 
guided by a continuing dominant theory (MacKenzie, 2013) of the laws of private 
finance:  
‘I guess what you have to try and do is work with what you have inside the 
system, and then tweak it rather than require a fundamental new idea to 
introduce, because the more dramatic the change, then the longer it’s going to 
take, the more painful it’s going to be for it to happen’ (UK Government 
Officer, Low Carbon Investment Team).  
 
Such bricolage, Engelen et al. (2010) argue, may work to reformat markets by turning 
the  ‘nodal possibility into a profitable position by using whatever instruments are to 
hand to create a business model’ (p.56). This seems to characterise the position of UK 
GI, charged by UK government with discovery of profit-making potential in low 
carbon energy and energy efficiency investments, while remaining conscious of the 
need to demonstrate public benefits from the higher costs of private capital. This does 
not however recognise that bricolage may also embody subordinated knowledge of 
alternative social and cultural hierarchies of value which could be brought into play:  
 
B: It would be interesting if someone carved out three or four hundred million, and 
they said ‘okay, London, with parts of Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow, 
Edinburgh, here we go, thirty/forty million pounds each; go and develop your 
scheme.’ But that’s very much going back to the nineteen thirties; it’s New Deal, it 
goes against the culture of where we are… and I don’t see that happening.  
… 
Interviewer: Do you think that will be forthcoming though? 
A: Probably not, because … it’s not in the ethos or the culture of how the government 
wants to deal with energy. It doesn’t really want to step in and be a big planner.  
B: Yes, you could float the argument really: leaving it all to the market, actually, what 
are you doing? You’re really just abdicating your responsibilities and side-stepping.  
(Environmental Finance Specialists A and B). 
The speculation by finance experts on the tenets of contemporary financial models 
echoes the sociology of knowledge argument that knowledge is a matter of shared 
belief which may or may not be true (Bloor, 2004). A core tenet of the current energy 
project finance model for example is that debt is cheaper than equity (Appendix 1). 
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This may have increased the risk aversion of urban authorities to equity investment in 
heat network development. In private enterprise, state regulation allows interest paid 
on debt financing to be set against tax, making equity more expensive in the short 
term. Given the different tax status of local authorities, however, an equity stake in 
energy infrastructure confers some advantages; equity overcomes the problem of the 
time lag between infrastructure investment and revenues, and confers control over 
strategic direction. Even in private enterprise, the belief that debt finance is always 
preferable because of its lower cost has been challenged by formal financial 
economics; the Modigliani-Miller theorem shows that, over the long term, the balance 
between equity and debt in an enterprise makes no difference to the overall cost of 
capital (MacKenzie, 2013). There is controversy over the conditions under which this 
may apply, but the point to be highlighted here is that current financial models are not 
inviolable. The financial innovations characterising the contemporary mode of capital 
accumulation, which prioritise debt financing through market instruments, may be 
working to the detriment of a more sustainable, secure and affordable energy system. 
Bricolage activity identifies the dissonances which limit current investment in 
sustainable urban energy, but has not yet resulted in coherent development of 
alternatives suited to the creation of a sequence of viable projects. 
Conclusion 
‘We keep using the phrase “the best is the enemy of the good”, and you’ve got to go 
out there and make some of it happen, because if nothing happens because we’re all 
paranoid about doing something, then that’s the worst outcome of all I think.’ (UK 
Government Officer, Low Carbon Investment Team). 
 
Attempts to reconfigure financial evaluations of urban energy infrastructure represent 
a moment where large-scale energy and financial market interests encounter questions 
about their future trajectory, and the future qualities, costs and control of energy 
provision. What is observable in these interviews, in policy meetings and trade 
forums are the attempts of actors to discover potential solutions, while securing 
relative socio-economic advantage from such improvised means. The current neo-
liberal economic orthodoxy, which prioritises use of financial mechanisms to 
incentivise private investment in energy infrastructure, shapes decision-making to rule 
in, and rule out, options. Expert practitioners engage in critical deconstruction of the 
orthodoxy, but they are unlikely to pursue radically different models, given their 
judgement that, in the present political-economic settlement, adjustment to 
mainstream finance models is more likely to prove productive. The ‘sunk investment’ 
in knowledge of financial instruments and markets, as well as in material 
infrastructure, the lobbying power of large corporations and the disempowerment of 
local levels of government mean that the search for solutions centres on minor 
adaptations to the dominant private finance model, referred to by one practitioner as 
‘son of PFI’ and by another as ‘taking the things that worked from PFI, and applying 
it here’. 
 
At the level of localities, bridging the gap between liberalised finance and local 
political and economic interests in urban energy projects requires considerable 
governance capacity, and has high transaction costs for the local authorities who are 
positioned as critical intermediaries. Faced with declining resources, local authority 
politicians and directors of housing, finance and economic regeneration perceive few 
benefits from the struggle to assemble finances for low carbon energy projects. 
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Centralised state control over their finances and reduced budgets are shrinking their 
role, as well as the material assets they have available in negotiating with private 
developers. Significant urban leadership for meso-scale CHP and DH as a component 
of a low carbon energy system would require greater budgetary autonomy for local 
government in a regulatory framework which re-values social and environmental 
benefits of local economic regeneration. These conclusions are in line with the work 
of Stewart Russell which found that earlier district energy projects were stalled by a 
UK economy and polity oriented to commercial economies of scale and weak social 
obligations. The paper extends his legacy by adding a new dimension, derived from 
the inter-related work on the sociology of knowledge, markets and social studies of 
finance, to his theoretical account. This work demonstrates the potential for critical 
insight into the restructuring of energy systems to be gained from a focus on the 
financial innovations which have dominated political economy for the last three 
decades. It suggests the societal value of a research agenda to develop social studies 
of energy markets and energy economics. Such research would in turn strengthen the 
conceptual basis of the sociology of markets through new insight into the interaction 
of the economic sciences with political struggle over definitions of legitimate value, 
interests and market rules. This paper has sought to contribute to such a programme of 
work.  
 
In relation to policy, there is scope for alternative district energy evaluation models to 
counter-balance technical-economic assessments of risk and value with questions of 
substantive risk and value in relation to public goods of ecology, economy and 
society. For the first time in the UK, there is an indication that new valuation models 
may be taking shape, at least in elementary form, through embryonic development of 
institutional authorities directly responsible for heat. The 2013 Heat Policy (UK 
DECC) established a Heat Networks Delivery Unit to contribute to early stage project 
development; government is also working with the industry to develop consumer 
protection and technical standards. The Scottish Government District Heating action 
plan and heat network partnership is also oriented to increasing development, with 
funding under the Renewable Energy Investment, Warm Homes and District Heating 
Loan funds, in a regional development model. 
 
It may be that financial innovation through the mainstream of de-risked investable 
projects and structured asset classes is the eventual trajectory for low carbon heat 
developments, but this can be achieved under a variety of governance structures, 
some providing more public accountability, transparency and checks on unearned 
profit than others. There are also alternatives to the current private sector energy 
utility model, which prioritises short-term maximisation of shareholder value in a 
global energy market. These are the many subordinated variants of public or 
community ownership, mutual enterprises, partnerships or consumer cooperatives in a 
less centralised, distributed energy system. One alternative to the complex financial 
engineering and costs of the private finance model is the non-profit model, where 
energy provision is governed by a community interest company, mutual enterprise or 
company limited by guarantee: ‘The not for profit model is more suited for where 
there is in effect a demand guarantee, which was the Aberdeen context. And was 
indeed the Wembley context as well effectively, okay, because the projects have got to 
be developed anyway. So there wasn’t this risk problem to be solved. So retrofit … 
the, sort of, community interest company approach does fit that very well’ (Finance 
Investment Consultant). Around 30% of UK municipal authorities are developing a 
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variety of ownership and governance models for urban energy projects. In the most 
advanced projects, these include consideration of mutual enterprise structures, where 
heat supply is owned and controlled by its users, as well as non-profit generation and 
supply companies, for-profit companies, and joint ventures between energy utilities 
and public bodies. In the current political-economic settlement, these are typically 
projects developed through the determination of ‘wilful individuals’6 (Local Authority 
Officer) who continue to believe that local government has a broadly specified 
responsibility for public welfare, and who persist in finding resourceful means to 
work within technical, financial and political constraints. A democratic commitment 
to reasoned consideration of routes to affordable, sustainable energy provisions in 
urban centres requires such options to be explicitly and actively maintained on the 
public agenda. Such a shift in the political framing of the energy debate would require 
changes in fiscal policy to direct long-term affordable investment into low carbon 
infrastructure responsive to regional social and economic benefits. 
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Appendix 1 
Figure 1 Financing principles – urban heat networks 
► Financing made up of Debt, Equity, or a combination. 
► Debt is traditionally cheaper, so idea is to include as much as possible, 
traditionally project financed waste or social infrastructure projects made up of 
c.80% debt, c.20% equity, based on project risk profile. 
► Equity normally provided by shareholders in equal proportions to shareholding. 
Public sector needs to fund its equity requirement, from reserves, PWLB7, grants 
etc. Drivers may be more than financial returns, so social and economic outcomes. 
► Financial model takes account of funding approach and costs, project revenues 
need to support cost inputs – IRR (return requirement) will decide the funding 
route taken. 
► Private sector return requirements (10%+) higher than public sector (5-6%).  
                                                 
7 Public Works Loan Board 
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► Reducing risk will increase IRR – robust electricity and heat off takes, easier with 
electricity, heat often seen as not bankable. 
Source: Extract from Ernst and Young Presentation to Financing District Heating 
Workshop, London, April 2012.  
 
Note 
There is ambiguity in the final point of the extract, which states that reducing risk will 
increase IRR (or the rate of return required on project lending). Reducing risk should 
reduce costs of lending. The point is that secure long-term heat and electricity supply 
contracts improve cash flow and business revenues, reducing risk of investment in 
CHP/DH. 
 
Appendix 2 – Interviewees Cited in Text 
1. Finance Investment Consultant - former civil service economist with 
responsibility for development of UK government privatisation instruments; 
former Director of a firm of Consulting Engineers; currently independent. 
2. Officer of UK government green investment team and former Director of a firm of 
Consulting Engineers. 
3. Environmental Finance Specialist A, Transnational Finance and Accounting 
Corporation.  
4. Environmental Finance Specialist B, Transnational Finance and Accounting 
Corporation. 
5.  Asset Management Consultant and former consulting engineer; construction 
industry specialist; former director of private equity fund in a major bank; 
currently independent.  
6. Corporate Banking Investment Manager, responsible for investments in energy 
efficiency in the built environment, including district energy infrastructure.  
7. Utility Senior Manager, energy networks - professional engineer with leadership 
and operational expertise in gas and electricity infrastructure. International 
experience of energy market restructuring. 
8. Local Authority Officer – team leader in sustainable development and energy in 
an English Borough Council; developer of a financial model to analyse options for 
local energy investments, and participant in the UK District Energy Vanguards 
network.  
 
 
